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THE TRIUMPH OF THE IRRATIONAL IN
POSTENLIGHTENMENT THEOLOGY
PAULFISHER
Tunkhannock, PA 18657

This essay advances the idea that a dualism between faith and reason
has come to characterize the postenlightenment theological enterprise.'
This severance of faith and rationality is rooted in philosophical and not
biblical modes of thought.2The result of this dualism is the triumph of the
irrational in the interpretation of religious symbols. It would appear that
the rigid confinement of faith and reason to autonomous spheres of
operation leads to the ascendance of nonhistorical, non~once~tual,
nonpsychological, and nonrational interpretations of biblical concepts.)
Historical Development of Dualism in Knowledge
The interplay of rationality and irrationality in the realm of religion
has been analyzed by the conservative Christian apologist Francis
Schaeffer. In his Escapefrom Reason, Schaeffer traced the development of
a dualism between faith and rationality beginning with Saint Thomas
'The term postenlightenment is used to include both modern and postmodern
theological developments. Schleiermacher, Bultmann, Barth, and Tillich are representative
of the modern viewpoint; Lindbeck is representative of the postmodern camp. Gerhard
Hasel, in a summary of the objections to historicalcriticismraised by E. Krentz, says, "Faith
and the historical-critical method have ddfering means of determining reality. Thus,
acceptance of historical criticism leads the Christian into intellectualdualism and forces him
to live in two worlds that clash" (Biblicallntqretation Today[Washington,DC: Review and
Herald, 1985],82); see also Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Faith and Reason," in Basic Questions in
lleology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), 47.
'George Lindbeck holds that "in modern times, propositional understandings of
religion have long been on the defensive and experiential-expressiveones in the ascendancy.
.. . The origins of this tradition in one sense go back to Kant, for he helped clear the ground
for its emergence by demolishing the metaphysical and epistemological foundations of the
earlier regnant cognitive-propositionalviews" (George A. Lindbeck, TheNature ofDoctrine:
Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age [Philadelphia: Westminster, 19841, 19-20).
'A classic example of this is Rudolph Otto, The Idea of the Holy: A n Inquiry into the
Nonrational Factor in the Idea of the Divine mad its Relation to the Rational, trans. John W .
Harvey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

Aquinas and ending with the twentieth-century existentialists.*Schaeffer
conceptualized this dualism as advancing in a series of dichotomies:
grace/nature, freedom/nature, and finally f a i t h / r a t i ~ n a l i t He
~ . ~argued
that grace, freedom, and faith referred to knowledge of the immaterial
realm ("upper storey" knowledge), while nature and rationality referred to
knowledge of the material realm ("lower storey" knowledge).' Schaeffer
argued that this dualism gradually resulted in a radical discontinuity
between "lower storey" and "upper storey" knowledge, and that ultimately
reason became confined to the natural, physical, observable, empirical
realm. The corresponding development was the relegation of religion to
the "upper storey" realm of knowledge with the consequence that faith
became thoroughly nonconceptual and nonrational.' Schaeffer perceived
that the equation of faith with the nonrational represented a serious
challenge to the doctrinal and conceptual elements of the biblical text. It
is, no doubt, true that if faith is essentially nonrational, the cognitive
element of religion is necessarily subordinate to the affective element. In
this way experience becomes the criterion of truth without significant
reference to the rational content of that experience.
The epistemological dualism between faith and rationality appears to
be related to the distinction in historical criticism between "Scripture" and
"Word of God." This distinction was first articulated by Johann Semler
in the 1770s and has been maintained through a powerful tradition,
including such influential thinkers as Rudolph Bultmann and Karl Barth.'

The Philosophical Basis of Dualism
The philosophical foundation which prepared the way for the
equation of faith with the nonrational mind was the transcendental
philosophy of Immanuel Kant. In the Prolegomena to Any Future
Metaphyscs Kant highlighted the main tenets of his philosophical system.9
He explained that the primary purpose of the transcendental philosophy
was "to determine the whole sphere of pure reason completely and from
'Francis Schaeffer, Escapefiom Reason (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1968).

'1 am indebted to Professor John Baldwin of the Seventh-day Adventist Theological
Seminary at Andrews University for this insightful analysis.
h a n u e l Kant, Prolegomena to A n y Future Metaphysics, trans. Paul Cams (Chicago:
Open Court, 1996).

general principles, in its circumferenceas well as in its contents."1° Central
to the thesis of this massive undertaking was Kant's insistence on "the
subjectivebasis of all external phenomena."" He attributed this "subjective
basis" of human reason to "sensibility itself."12 To this seminal idea Kant
referred repeatedly throughout the Prolegomena, of which I will cite three
particularly clear statements.
It is indeed. . . incomprehensible how the visualizing of a present thing
should make me know this thing as it is in itself, as its properties cannot
migrate into my faculty of representation."
Whereas I say, that things as objects of our senses existing outside us are
given, but we know nothing of what they may be in themselves, knowing
only their appearances, i.e., the representations which they cause in us by
affecting our senses.14
The object always remains unknown in itself; but when by the concept
of the understanding the connexion [sic] of the representations of the
object, which are given to our sensibility, is determined as universally
valid, the object is determined by this relation, and it is the judgment
that is objective."

It is clear that for Kant "objective" knowledge is related exclusively to
the "faculty of representation" or "judgment" and not to the "objects of
our senses existing outside us." This idea represents both a "limitation"
and an "extension" of the power of human reason. It is alimitation in that
the critical faculty is confined to appearances but cannot penetrate into
realities. It is an extension in that the mind is credited with the power of
imposing its conceptual grid on all of reality. As Kant remarked, "The
understanding does not derive its laws (aprion) from, but prescribes them
to, nature."" Thus transcendental philosophy erected an impenetrable
barrier between reason and the reality of "things in themselves." If it is
true that the rational faculty imposes its own image on the external world,
then it is limited as a means for comprehending anything outside the
domain of its own operations. This means that anyone looking for
anything other than 'subjective" knowledge would have to seek it apart
from the rational capacity.
"Ibid., 42.

"Ibid., 34.

The Psychological Basis of Dualism
William James, in the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion, delivered at
Edinburgh in 1901-1902,dealt at length with the relation of religion to the
human mind. In a lecture titled "The Reality of the Unseen" he arguedthat the
"subconscious and non-rational" mind is dominant "in the religious realm.""
It would appear that this assertion was based in part on a dualistic notion of
human nature. Said James: "If you have intuitions at all, they come from a
deeper level of your nature than the loquacious level which rationalism
inhabits."18In making that observationJames was expressing an influential idea
in the history of postenlightenment thought. If religion springs from a deep,
nonrational region of the human mind, it follows that reason has in fact little
to offer religion. If religion is primarily a function of the nonrational capacity
of the mind, the articulate formulation of the grounds and content of belief is
a peripheral and secondary matter. This is the conclusion reached by James in
his lecture 18 he said that "feeling is the deeper source of religion, and in which
philosophic and theological formulas are secondary products."19 In essence
James argued that religion is a function of the affective, imaginative,
nonrational capacity of the human mind and is not in any substantive way
rooted in reason. In such a system of thought the interaction of faith and
reason appears to be superficial. For James faith exceeds "verbal formulation,"
and reason fails to apprehend the "deeper level" of religious experience?'
In his analysis, reason and faith are placed in the context of the
antipathy between rationalism and mysticism." In his lecture on
"Mysticism," James stated that "religious experiencehas its root and center
in mystical states of consciousness."22 He explained that mystical
consciousness "defies expression," in the sense that "no adequate report of
its contents can be given in words," and mediates "insight into depths of
truth unplumbed by the discursive intelle~t."~'
The identification of religion
with mysticism gives prominence to the nonverbal, nonintellectual,
nonconceptual aspects of the religious experience. In t h s way the rational
articulation of the faith is subordinated to the affective experience. As James
"William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (New
York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1928), 74.

put it, "Instinct leads, intelligencedoes but follow."" It would appear that
the psychological foundation of the dualism between faith and rationality
is rooted in an anthropological dualism.

Friedrich Schleimachw: Cognition and Religion
Friedrich Schleiermacher(1768-1834),a Prussian theologian, has been
credited with setting the agenda of postenlightenment theological
enquiry." One of the critical issues that Schleiermacher's writings raise is
the relation of cognition and religion.26In his first influential work O n
Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, he attacked rationalism and
dogmatism by advancing the notion that "ideas and principles are all
foreign to religion."" The sentiment thus expressed was not merely a
rhetorical device reflecting the Pietist influences of his upbringing but
central to the main argument of the Speeches. That argument was
articulated by Schleiermacher in the First Speech:
I maintain that in all better souls piety springs necessarily by itself; that
a province of its own in the mind belongs to it, in which it has unlimited
sway; that it is worthy to animate most profoundly the noblest and best
and to be fully accepted and known by them.28

The "province of its own in the mind" from which piety "springs" is,
according to Schleiermacher, an immediate understanding, "immediate
feeling," and "immediate consciousness" of the "Infinite and Eternal"
presence that pervades all of life.29 It seems that this "immediate
consciousness" of the "infinite" transcends rationality, for it refuses to
recognize the antitheses that "morality," "philosophy," and systematic
theology acknowledge. He states:
Only when the free impulse of seeing, and of living is directed towards
the Infinite and goes into the Infinite, is the mind set in unbounded
liberty. . . . In this respect, it is all worthy of preservation and
contemplation, however much, in other respects, and in itself, it is to be
rejected. To a pious mind religion makes everything holy, even
unholiness and commonness, whether it is embraced in his system of

"Keith Clements, Friedrich Schleiermacher:Pioneer ofModern Theology, The Making of
Modern Theology (h4inneapolis:Fortress, 1991),7.
26FriedrichSchleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, trans.John
Oman (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958),43-49.
27Schleiermacher,On Religion, 46.
28Schleiermacher,On Religion, 2 1.

thought, or lies outside, whether it agrees with his peculiar mode of
acting or disagrees. Religion is the natural and sworn foe of all
narrowmindedness, and of all onesidene~s.~~
For Schleiermacher there could be no equation of a sacred text and the
dynamic, essential element in religion:
Not every person has religion who believes in a sacred writing, but only
the man who has a lively and immediate understanding of it, and who,
therefore, so far as he himself is concerned, could most easily do without
ite3'

In hisview, texts are merely "propositions which arose purely out of reflection
upon the religious emotions."32 It would seem that for Schleiermacher the
rational forrn&xion of the faith represented so much wasted ink, for "all forms
are too rigid, all speech-malungtoo cold and tedious."33
Schleiermacher's contribution to hermeneutics should not be
overlooked. H e viewed the hermeneutical task as both a philosophical
enterprise and a form of art." "Understanding a speech," according to
Schleierrnacher,"always involves two moments: to understand what is said
in the context of the language with its possibilities, and t o understand it as
a fact in the thinking of the speaker."" Corresponding to these two
"moments" is the interpreter's "linguistic competence" and "ability for
knowing people."36 Schleiermacher's comment o n the latter skill is
particularly illuminating. "One's ability to know people refers especially
to a knowledge of the subjective element determining the composition of
th~u~hts."'~Because
of this "subjective element" between the thought and
the written word, it followed that the interpreter ultimately had "no direct
knowledge of what was in the author's mind."3Wowever, this was of no
real concern for Schleiermacher because all religious documents are only
"the handiwork of the calculating understanding. . . not the character of
I0Ibid.,On Religion, 56.
"Ibid., On Religion, 9 1.
"Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith (Edinburgh:T & T Clark, 1948),82.
"Friedrich Schleiermacher,ChristmasEve: Dialogueon the Incarnation,trans. Terrence
Tice (Richmond,VA; John Knox, 1967), 85.
"Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts, American
Academy of Religion Texts and Translations (Missoula:Scholars, 1977),95-96.

religion."39The severance of faith and rationality in Schleiermacheris most
evident in his insistence on the primacy of 'immediate feeling."

Rudolph Bultmann: Dem ythologized Faith
Rudolph Bultmann (1884-1976) is best known for his demythologizingof
the NT. This method of biblical interpretation aimed to "recover the deeper
meaning behind" such "mythological conceptions" as the virgin birth,
preexistence, divinity, and second coming of Jesus Christ, as well as other
biblical ideas rejected by modern science.40For Bultmann the modern
scientific conception of the world as a closed "nexus" of "cause and effect" is
as axiomatic."" This "scientific" presupposition admits of no
visible, historical, or objective activity of God in the world. Bultmann
affirmed: "The whole of nature and history is profane. It is only in the light of
the proclaimed word that what has happened or is happening here or there
assumes the character of God's action for the believer."42For Bultmann
objective events in the real world only assume the "character of God's actionn
by faith in the 'proclaimed word." Thus "faith" is not directed toward the
objective events but toward interpreted events.
For what we call facts of redemption are themselves objects of faith and are
apprehended as such only by the eye of faith. They cannot be perceived apart
from faith, as if faith could be based on data in the same way as the n a d
sciences are based on data which are open to empirical ob~ervation.~~
It is instructive to look at Bultmann's demythologization of NT
Christology as an example of how "faith" and "empirical observation" are
distinguished.
It is precisely the mythological description of Jesus Christ in the New
Testament which makes it clear that the figure and the work of Jesus Chrii
must be understood in a manner which is beyond the categories by which
the objective historian understandsworld-history, ifthe figure and the work
of Jesus Christ are to be understood as the divine work of redemption.*
For Bultmann the "categories by which the objective historian understands
world-history" are incompatible with the biblical (mythological)
39Schleiermacher,On Religion, 15.
40RudolphBultmann,Jesus Christ andMytholoay (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1958), 14-18.
41RudolphBultmann, Faith and Understanding, ed. Robert W. Funk, trans. Louise
Pettibone Smith (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 1:247-248.
Jesus Christ and Mythology, 85.
42Bultmann,

431bid.,72.

description of the divine person and work of Jesus Christ. Because of this,
"Jesus Christ must be understood in a manner which is beyond" these
"categories." But rather than accept "the mythological description of Jesus
Christ in the New Testament" as trustworthy, Bultmann insisted on
reinterpreting the divine person and work of Christ along secular
historical lines. He fully recognized the paradoxical nature of this
endeavor. "This is the paradox of faith, that faith 'nevertheless'
understands as God's action here and now an event which is completely
intelligible in the natural or historical connection of events."45
It is astonishing that Bultmann could identify "an event which is
completely intelligible in the natural or historical connection of events"
with "God's action." But it is crucial to note that this identification was
not a rational observation but the "nevertheless" of faith. For Bultmann,
faith was a decision to believe in the divine activity in the world in spite
of rational knowledge to the contrary." He noted: "For it is beyond the
sphere of historical observation to say that this Word and its proclamation
are God's act."47For Bultmann the dualism between faith and reason was
crucial to his program of demythologization.

Karl Barth: "FaithAlone" Epistemology
Karl Barth (1886-1968) exerted tremendous influence on twentiethcentury theological thought through his "dialectical" theology. Dialectical
theology is essentially a rejection of natural revelation in theological
epistemology, i.e., the refusal to acknowledge any human source of the
knowledge of God.'* Barth crystallized this rejection in his sharp response
to an open letter by Emil Brunner titled "Nature and Grace," which
argued for a legitimate natural theology. "Real rejection of natural
theology does not form part of the creed. Nor does it wish to be an exposition of the creed and of revelation. It is merely an hermeneutical rule,
forced upon the exegete by the creed . . . and by revelation.""
According to Barth, the problem with natural revelation is that it
added to "the knowability of God in Jesus Christ," the "also" of "his

'"Faith in God, indeed, is never a possession, but rather always a decision." Rudolph
Bultmann, 'The Crisis of Faith,"in Rudolph Bultmnn: Interpreting Faithfor the Modem Era,
ed. Roger Johnson (Minneapolis:Fortress, 1991), 251.

'Clifford Green, Karl Barth: Theologian ofFreedom (Minneapolis:Fortress, 199I), 151.

'%arlBarth, 'No! Answer to Ernil Brunner,"in Natural Theology(London: Centenary,
1946), 76.

knowability in nature, reason, and history." As he pointed out in his
criticism of the "German nature and history myth" underlying the Nazi
ideology, the "also" is in reality an "only."50For ~ a r t the
h "also" of natural
revelation rivaled the exclusivity of sola Smptura, sola fide, and solus
Christus. "An idea, constructed with the claim to be an idea of God, is as
such, not as an idea but simply because of this claim, an idol from the
standpoint of the exclusiveness expressed in the biblical te~timonies."~~
The concept that "an idea of God" is "an idol" is avirulent expression
of Barth's understanding of "rationality" as the antithesis of "revelation."
In his explosive commentary on Romans he laid the foundation for his
massive assault on reason. Barth acknowledged that his exposition of
Romans was essentially a systematic recognition of the "infinite qualitative
distinction" (a phrase borrowed from Kierkegaard) between the human
and the divine.12Notice in particular the concept of "truth" that emerged
from the crucible of this dialectic:
The truth, in fact, can never be self-evident,because it is a matter neither
of historical nor of psychological experience, and because it is neither a
cosmic happening within the natural order, nor even the most supreme
event of our imaginings. Therefore it is not accessibleto our perception:
it can neither be dug out of what is unconsciously within us, nor
apprehended by devout contemplation, nor made known by the
manipulation of occult psychic powers.53
The assertion that "truth" is not "historical" or "psychological," and
ultimately "not accessible to our perception," is stunning. And yet this
insight lies at the heart of Barth's theology, which is consistently framed
using the language of paradox. In defining truth as nonhistorical and
nonpsychological he struck a blow against liberalism's insistence on the
"knowability of God in nature, reason, and history" and defended the
unpopular notion of supernatural divine revelation. However, the
argument itself revealed Barth's acceptance of the dualism between faith
and rationality that has permeated the thought of postenlightenment
culture. If "truth" is neither "historical" nor "psychological," it would
follow that it is not rationally accessible or even communicable. How is
truth then to be received? Barth provided an answer in a statement dealing
with NT Christology: "Jesus is presented to us unmistakably as the Christ,
%KarlBarth, Church DogmaticsII/I, trans. G. T. Thomson (Edmburgh:T & T Clark,
1957),

173, 174.

"Barth, Church Dogmatics I/I, 449.
52KarlBarth, TheEpistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1965), 99; Green, Karl Bad, 17.

53Barth,Romans, 98.

but his Messiahship is also presented to us as a sharply defined paradox. It
is a matter for faith only."54
The concept of solaf i e expressed here is extremely important for Barth.
He understood "faith alone" as the ultimate ground of any authentic
knowledge of God. Barth's work Anselm: Fzdes Qumens Intellectum is a
careful analysis of Anselm's Proof of the Existence of God and a statement of
the importance of solafide for theological epistemology. Anselm's approach to
the question of God's existence is cited approvingly by Barth: "Grant me to
understand-as much as Thou seest fit-that Thou dost exist as we believe
Thee to exist, and that Thou art what we believe Thee to be."55
Notice that for both Anselm and Barth, faith ("we believe Thee to
exist") precedes understanding ("grant me to understand"). Barth argued
persuasively that Anselm's proof was in fact a rational, intellectual
articulation of the "thought of the existence and nature of God," which
was first accepted as "credible on other gro~nds."~'The "other grounds,"
on which the existence of God is accepted, is faith alone. For Barth "faith
alone" meant an acceptance of the "givens" of divine revelation with no
psychological, historical, or rational assurances.
Faith is the faithfulnessof God, ever secreted in and beyond all human
ideas and affirmations about him, and beyond every positive religious
achievement. There is no such thing as mature and assured possession of
faith: regarded psychologically, it is always a leap into the darkness of
the unknown, a flight into empty air, . . . a leap into the void.57
For Barth the severance of faith and rationality was the epistemological
equivalent of the doctrine of justification by faith alone.

Paul Tillich: "Ultimate Concern without Content
JJ

Paul Tillich (1886-1965) sustained a lifelong theological interest in the
relationship between religion and culture. One of the primary objectives
of his writings was the articulation of a theology of culture, a
"theonomy,"58which he explainedin the followingterms: "Atheonomous
culture expresses in its creations an ultimate concern and a transcending

%arl Barth, Anselm: Fides Quarens Intellectum (London: SCM, 1960),13.

57Barth,Romans, 98-99.
58PaulTillich, 7'he Protestant Era, trans. James Luther Adam (Chicago:University of
Chicago Press, 1948),55-65.

meaning not as something strange but as its own spiritual ground."59
Tillich referred to his cultural theology as "a fresh interpretation of the
mutual immanence of religion and culture within each other."60 His
concept of "transcending meaning" as the "spiritual ground" of culture is
crucial. For Tillich "transcendence" was not something outside of human
reality but entirely within the realm of time, history, and culture. Because
"transcendence" is the "spiritual groundn of all finite reality, the concept
of supernatural or special revelation was rejected by Tillich. "If it is the
nature of fundamental religious experience to negate the entire cognitive
sphere and affirm it through negation, then there is no longer any lace for
a special religious cognition, a special religious object, or special methods
of religious epistemology."61 Having discarded the concept of special
revelation, Tillich redefined revelation within the context of his
theonomy. "Revelation is the manifestation of the ultimate ground and
meaning of human existence. It is not a matter of objective knowledge, of
empirical research or rational inference.""
It is significant that the rejection of "special" revelation, the negation
of the "entire cognitive sphere," and the divorce of revelation from
empirical, rational, objective knowledge go hand in hand. This would
seem to indicate that for Tillich, reason is inadequate as a means of
apprehending the "ultimate concern" of religion. He stated directly that
rationality does not "give the content" of theology and that "every
debate that remains only in the rational plane does not penetrate to the
essence" of reality." For Tillich reason is exclusively related to only one
level of knowledge. "There is a level in life, the most and ultimately the
only important one, which cannot be approached directly. It is the level
of gnosis or sapientia or 'wisdom,' in distinction from the level of
episteme or scientia or '~cience.'"~
He approvingly cited examples of
those who, like him, were engaged in the search for this gnostic
knowledge at the deepest level of reality.

61PaulTillich, "On the Idea of a Theology of Culture," in Paul Tillich: 7IJeologianof
the Boundaries, ed. Mark Kline Taylor (Minneapolis:Fortress, 1991), 41.
62PaulTillich, "The Problem of Theological Method," in Four Existentialist 73eologians, ed. Will Herberg (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1958), 275.
'j31bid.,276; Paul Tillich, "Basic Principles of Religious Socialism," in Political
Expectation, ed. James Luther Adam (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 61.
64Tillich,The Protestant Era, 65.

Theories of intuitive knowledge, classicist and romantic revivals of ancient
or medieval forms of thought, phenomenology, the philosophy of life
(aestheticor vitalistic),the "theory of Gestalt," some types of the psychology
of the "unconsciousn-all these seek for the inner power of things beyond (or
below) the level at which they are calculable and do~ninable.~~

Ultimately, for Tillich the incalculable essence of all life was a revelation
of the "infinite depth and the eternal significance of the present."u However,
such an insight was "possible only in terms of a paradox, by faith, for, in itself,
the present is neither infinite nor eternal."67Faith is an "immediateawarenessn
of the unconditional ground of being" However, such faith is "empty,"
"undirected," "absolute," "undefinable," and imperviousto doubt because it has
"no special content" that can be scientifically or philosophically challenged."
For Tillich the ultimate concern of religion was not a matter of cognitive
knowledge but of incomprehensible theonomous reality.
George Lindbeck: Rationally Vacuous Faith
The classic expression of postmodern or postliberal theology is George
Lindbeck's The Nature ofDoctrine." In it he compares preliberal cognitivepropositionalism,liberal experiential-expressivism, and postliberal culturallinguistic theories of d~ctrine.~'
Cognitivism holds that "church doctrines
function as informative propositions or truth claims about objective
realities."" This approach to religious truth was historically dominant
until experiential-expressivismbecame the regnant viewpoint after Kant."
Expressivism represents a shift toward subjective experience.
Thinkers of this tradition all locate ultimately significant contact with
whatever is f d y important to religion in the prereflective experiential
depths of the self and regard the public or outer features of religion as

68Tillich,"The Problem of Theological Method,"276.
'qbid.; Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), 176.
"George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology i n a Postliberal Age
(Philadelphia:Westrninster, 1984). See also idem, The Nature of Confession: Evangelicals and
Postliberals i n Conversation, ed. Timothy R. Phillips and Dennis L. Okholrn (Downers
Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1996).

expressive and evocative objectifications (i.e., nondiscursive symbols) of
internal e~~erience.7~
Lindbeck finds both cognitive and expressive approaches to religion
unsatisfactory. Apparently through ecumenical dialogue he felt "compelled by
the evidence . . . to conclude that [doctrinal] positions that were once really
opposed are now really re~oncilable."~~
This situation led to the search for a
new paradigm in which to understand religious truth.
Postliberal cultural-linguistic theories of religion draw from
"anthropological, sociological, and philosophical literature" to highlight
those "respects in which religions resemble languages . . . and are thus
similar to cultures."" The result of this culturalism is that the conceptual
element of religion is subordinated to other elements.
Thus while a religion's truth claims are often of the utmost importanceto it (as
in the case of C h r i i t y ) , it is, nevertheless,the conceptualvocabulary and the
syntax or inner logicwhich determinethe hinds of truth claims the rehgon can
make. The cognitive aspect, while oftenimportant, is not primary.n
The propositional truths of religion are not primary, because "its inner
structure" is "far richer and more subtle than can be explicitly
articulated."" This "inner structure" is composed of "first-intentional" o r
subconscious 'cognitive acti~ities."~~
Official church doctrines represent
"second-orderdiscourse" on "first-intentional uses of religious language."80
Lindbeck acknowledges that postliberalism leads to an "informational
vacuity" in significant church doctrines." For example, notice how he
deals with the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus:
The signifcaturnof the claim that Jesus truly and objectively was raised from
the dead provides the warrant for behaving in the ways recommendedby the
resurrection storieseven when one grants the impossibility of specdying the
mode in which those stories ~igxufy.8~
For culturalism 'objective" truth is not related to the "significatum" (the

proposition) but to the "significator" (the language in which the
proposition was articulated). Doctrines make "intrasystematicrather than
ontological truth claim^."^' The example that Lindbeck uses to illustrate
"intrasystematic" truth is significant. "Similarly, to cite yet another parallel,
the statement "Denmark is the land where Hamlet livednis intrasystematically
true w i t h the context of Shakespeare's play, but this implies nothing regarding
ontological truth or falsity unless the play is taken as h~story."~
For cult~alkm
the truth of Scripture is "immanent" as a "semioticuniverse
paradigmatically encoded in holy writ."" This "categorial truth"" is rationally
and informationally vacuous and thus is not subject to any external criteria of
evaluation. Even Lindbeck recognizes the irrational tendencies of culturalism.
If there are no universal or foundational suuctures and standards of judgment
by which one can decide between different rehgous and nonreligiousoptions,
the choice of any one of them becomes, it would seem, purely irrational, a
matter of arbitrarywhim or blind faith,and while thisconclusionmay fit much
of the modem mood, it is antithetical to what most religons, whether
interpretedin liberal, preliberal,or postliberal fashion, have affirmed?'

It seems clear that for cultural-linguistictheories of religion, faith and reason
continue to be conceived in a dualistic sense.

What are the implications of the idea that faith and reason function in two
totally separated and mutually exclusive domains of the human consciousness?
What are the rdcations
of a dualistic anthropology which severs faith and
reason? In particular, what is the sipficance of the concept that reason cannot
plumb the depths of religion? Although comprehensive answers to these
questions would require a more thorough treatment than can be given in this
essay, at least one response can be advanced In the interpretation of sacred texts
the epistemological d&m of reason and faith and the identification of religion
exdusively with the nonrational domain of the human mind lead to the
hermeneutical triumph of the irrational. It would seem that an identification of
religion with the nonrational mind might result in the treatment of a religious
text as a mere rational, verbal, superficial expression of a profoundly deep and
inexpressible experience. This deeper meaning of the religious text is rationally
impenetrable and infommunicable and can only be apprehended by the
"Ibid., 80.

nonrational, subconscious capabilities of the human mind. In this way the
irrational mind comes to dominate and control the interpretive enterprise. This
is, then, in reality the kind of thought that has come to dominate the
postenlightenment theological enterprise.
As has been seen in the philosophical, psychological, and theological
documents examined in this essay, postenlightenment thought has tended
toward the complete severance of faith and rationality. While rendering faith's
claims impervious to the criticism of historical reason, this situation has also
placed faith squarely in the realm of the nonrational.
From this perspective it could be argued that the historicalmtical study of
the Word of God has led to the formation of a faith that is nonhistorical,
nonpsychological,and nonconceptual. It would appearthat in the contemporary
~eriod
faith has become the equivalentof a stubborn insistence on the "truth" of
that for which there is ultimately no rational foundation. It is not at all clear that
this is a desirable development.

A critique of the severance of faith and rationality must necessarily begin
with an examination of the biblical materials relevant to this issue. Since it is
beyond the smpe of this study to offer a comprehensivetreatment of this topic,
the discussion is limited to a brief examination of a few of the relevant biblical
themes and passages.
The first-chapter of Genesis lays the foundation of a biblical anthropology.
"The Lord God formed the man from the dust of the ground and breathed into
his nostrils the breath of life, and the man became a living being (Gen 2:7, literal
translation).
In this perspective the human being is an indissoluble unity of material (dust
of the ground) and immaterial (breath of life) components.88The physical,
mental and spiritual existence of the individual is woven into a single fabric of
being (1Thes 5:23)." In the totality of its existence, in every sphere of its being,
the human creature in its original perfection was made in the "image of God"
(Gen 1:27). This represents the seminal expression of biblical anthropology and
"This is often referred to as Hebrew "totality thinking." See James Barr, 7he Garden
of Eden and the Hope oflmmortality (Minneapolis:Fortress, 1992), 36-38. The classic study
on the psychosomatic unity of human nature in Scripture is Oscar Cullrnann, Immortality
of the Soul or Resurrection of theDead? 7be Witnessof the New Testament (London:Epworth,
1958). For a modern treatment of this subject from an Adventist point of view, see Ginger
Hanks-Harwood,"Wholeness,"in Remnant andRepublic:Adventist % m e s for Personal and
Social Ethics, ed. Charles W. Teel, Jr. (Lorna Linda, CA: Lorna Linda University, 1995), 127144.
'Wnless otherwise indicated, all Bible texts are taken from the New International
Version (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1978).

is relevant to the severance of faith and rationality in at least two ways. First, it
precludes any sharp dualism which would rigidly compartmentalize the various
aspects of the human personality. The Genesis creation narrative does ths by its
insistence that the human person (nephesh= livingbeing) is a composite unity of
body and spirit. These dimensions of human existence are indivisible as far as
their functionsand spheresof operation are concerned. From this perspective the
characterization of faith and reason as mutually exclusive and independent in
operation is an illegitimate citstinction. Second, as a creature in the "image of
God" the human has, in every dunension of its being, a contact point with the
transcendent Creator. Because of this, rationality is not in any sense to be
considered as an inferior instrument in the quest for truth and understanding.
The creation of human beings in the image of God does not entirely exhaust
the biblical perspective on the relationship of faith and reason. Although human
beings are made in the image of God, they are not of the same nature as God.
The categoriesthat best expressthe distinctionbetween Creator and creatureare
infiite and f i t e . The biblical witness is consistent in its insistence on the radical
discontinuity of the human and the divine (1 Tim 1:lf).The obliteration of this
crucial distinction is the essence of idolatry (Rom 1:2428).
An important extensionof the distinctionbetween the infnite God and the
f i t e human being is the limitation of the powers of the human mind. Isaiah
expressed this concept powerfully. "'For my thoughts are not your thoughts,
neither are your ways my ways,' declares the Lord. 'As the heavens are higher
than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than
your thoughts'" (Isa 555:-9).%In this utterance the prophet employed the
categoryof infinitespace to conveythe distinctionbetween the mind of God and
the mind of the human being. This insiienceon the incomprehensibility of God
might appear, on the surface, to bolster the rift between faith and reason that we
have traced in this essay. If God is infinitely beyond all hurnan powers of
comprehension, surely the dnceptual and rational character of theological
knowledgemust be secondaryto relational, experiential,immediateknowledge.
The function of biblical language which emphasizes God's incomprehensibletranscendence is not meant to relativize all rational epistemologiesbut
to instill appropriateh u d t y in the human mind. God's transcendencedoes not
render conceptual,propositionalknowledge meaningless but rather safeguardsit
from a presumption that borders on idolatrous arrogance.
T o n Rad views this text as one among other "references to the incomprehensibility
of Jahwehnin the OT. Gerhard Von Rad, Old Testament Theology: The Theology of Israel's
Historical Traditions, trans. D.M.G. Stalker (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962)' 453.
Brueggemann believes this text contains a "sapiential motif" which teaches that "God's
capacity to hide things outdistances the capacity of the kings to find outn (Walter
Brueggemann, Old Testament Theology..Essays on Structure, Theme, and Text, ed. Patrick D.
Miller [Minneapolis: Fortress, 19921,295).

The insight that human thought is not divine is monotheism's answer to
idolatrouspolytheism. It is not a critique of the content of human thought but
of its character. The comprehending powers of the human mind are not
rendered insigrdicant because of their finitenature. However, a realization of the
finiteness of the rational apparatus is a prerequisite for a stimulating mental
encounter with the transcendent God

CulturalFaith or Bibld Fuith$&Zness?
Faith in the postenlightenment period, as was seen in the analysis of
sign$cant thinkers, is often explained in terms of paradox. It appears to have the
connotation of an acceptanceof that for which there is ultimately no empirical,
historical, psychological, scientific, or rational verification. In this epistemology
faith begins where reason ends. This aspect of the severance of faith and
rationality should also be critiqued in the light of the biblical witness. The Bible
does draw a sharp distinctionbetween those who see only with the empiricaleye
and those who see with the eye of faithsnIn fact, the new birth or conversion is
explicitly identified as the prerequisite for those who would "see" the kingdom
of God (John 3:14). However, this distinction between natural and spiritual
vision should not be interpreted ontologically. This would lead to an
anthropological dualism that would strictly compartmentalize the spiritual
insight and the ~ h ~ s i coptical
a l capacity. Although the two modes of seeing are
not identical, they are not unrelated. And for this reason faith is not completely
divorced from the physical, visible, material realm of event and activity. As Paul
wrote, "'No eye has seen, no ear has heard, no mind has conceived what God has
for those who love hunY-but God has revealed it to us by his Spirit.
The Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of Godn9*
According to the apostle Paul, that which was previously invisible,
inaudible, and inconceivable had in his preaching of the gospel now become
visible, audible, and conceivable by a gracious action of God's Spirit. It is in the
realm of horical, sensual knowledge that God disclosestranscendent meaning.
The knowledge of God is mediated through the five senses in exactly the same
way as all other knowledge. "For since the creation of the world God's invisible
q~alities-his eternal power and divine nature-have been dearly seen, being
understood from what has been made, so that men are without excuse" @om
1:20).
Faith, in its futureorientation, is related to that which is not yet visible or
audible but only potential in the form of promise (Heb 11:1). However, this
eschatological dimension of faith is presented in the context of a rehearsal of
912Cor 4:18; 5:7; Eph 1:18;Heb 1:l.
'*l Cor 2:9, NIV. Cf. Job 12:22;Dan 2:22,28;Amos 4:13.

the faith experiences of Israel's heroes, which in every instance are related to
some specifichistorical event or activity (Heb ll:2ff).Thus we can reason that
faith, even though oriented toward the future for its ultimate fulfillment, is
grounded on the historically,psychologically,and rationally discernibleevents
of the past history of the people of God.

In this essay we have traced the sharp dualism of faith and reason in
postenLghtenment theology. Thls dualism is rooted in philosophical and not
biblical modes of thought. In every instance thxs dualism has led to a devaluation
of the conceptual character of religious belief. The result is that a primary
connotation of faith in the contemporary period is the acceptance of religious
claims for which there is ultimately no convincing historical, conceptual,
psychological, or rational evidence.
On one level this phenomenon appears to be some sort of intellectual
gnosticism intent on subverting an entire dimension of human existence, i.e., the
rational life of the mind. On another level such faith has been secured from the
attacks of scientific criticism because reason has been granted its own
autonomous sphere of operation which excludes the realm of faith, and vice
versa. In such an epistemology faith and reason are neither friend nor foe.
Although such neutrality may serve a positive political and social function in a
pluralistic world, it does not appear to aid in the serious quest for truth. The
questionthat must be addressedis whether the price of a rationally vacuous faith
is not too high.
An intellectually satlsfylng and biblically sound alternative to the
pornenlightenmentseverance of faith and reason must be sought. Religious beliefs
should not be embraced irrationally,and reason should not be employed unfaithfully. As persons made in the image of God and redeemed by the sacrifice of
Christ, Christians should engage their affections and cognitions in the quest to
understand and obeythe psychologically, historically,conceptually,andultimately
rationally revealed will and Word of God

